The initiating question of this essay is as follows:.

How is it that an organic system can be personally and directly experienced as having the attributes of intentionality, mind, and consciousness, when it is also regarded as uncontested truth that the inorganic physical substrate out of which all of all of such systems are inherently composed is completely and perfectly void of all such characteristics?

In other words, how does a 1st person experience arise from purely 3rd person reality (ie, as impersonal matter, interactions, etc)?

Part of the difficulty in addressing 'Hard Problem' questions like this is that it is not always easy to identify exactly what the 'problem' exactly is. It must be determined exactly what question is actually being asked, and moreover, to have that question specified in a language specific enough, formal and precise enough, so as to provide the necessary tools that might potentially yield a calculable answer.

As is generally evident, the notions and concepts of 'intentionality', 'mind', and 'consciousness', all/each inherently involving aspects of temporality. Consciousness is always a 'consciousness of' something, as had by a subjectivity, at a given moment. Intentionality is always considered with respect to the resolution of a future state, some desired condition, with respect to some other moment, which regarded as the present.

Even the process of mind, of thinking, and even of self perception, as in the Descartes dictum "I think, therefore I am", are all referring to a kind of 'tight ring', a fast and immediate recursion which is bound to a localization of self awareness at a given actual moment of time.

As such, while none of the examples require the identification of 'which' actual moment is involved, as compared to the absolute measure of some civil clock or calendar, it is nonetheless the implication that there is somehow always a unique temporal and temporary specificity. Somehow there seems to be a specific momentarily unique experienced present, as fully and absolutely contrasted to all other possible times and places, as if somehow that present moment is not actually in any sort of fixed relation to all others.

Yet when considering the theories of physics, whether it be in the form of Newton's Laws of motion, or later in the manner of General Relativity or even in the more modern contexts of consideration associated with the various interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, that all of these theories and formulations treat time as 'non-special', as non-localized and as completely without a-prior specificity with respect to what we would regard as a 'present'. Each of these three types of physical models will inherently treat time as a typed dimension of space, as a parametrization that not only admits of any arbitrary setting, it also allows for repositioning -- calculation of motion -- in either direction.

It is inherent in the deep nature of all such questions relating to the 'hard problem' that a reconciliation as to the specific nature of temporality must be accomplished, and that only by doing so, can such problems as identified, in their essence, be addressed.

What is the problem, exactly, that is considered 'hard'? Why is it Hard?

In the literature on this subject, in various ages, in both philosophy and in physics, there have been multiple and diverse presentations and questions as to the actual and true nature of the relation between mind and body. As such, it is necessary to disentangle some issues with which such concerns are often conflated.

In one manifestation, we can see a consideration that recognizes that no amount of knowledge, no matter how great and extensive, equates to any (small) amount of understanding, and that moreover, that no (great, well specified, etc) amount of understanding (as 3rd person information) equates to any (small) amount of knowledge (ie, in the form of 1st person experience).

We can see this, situationally, by considering the child of a florist, who although experiencing a riot of color every day, will not thereby automatically come to any theoretical understanding of color theory, light, optics, frequencies of electromagnetism, details relating to rods and cones in the eye, or of the structure of the nervous system and the brain when perceiving color.

Yet it is also the case, that a competent and well educated scientist, who understands all of these things, perhaps in great and exhaustive detail, and which also happens to have been born color blind, will not thereby in their totality of knowledge, be able to actually replicate, in their own experience, in their own knowing, even the least moment of what it actually is like to perceive a given color.

So from this we can admit that the 'domain of knowledge' and the 'domain of understanding' are somehow separate, distinct, and that the exchanges and transforms between them, moreover than being not so automatically mediated, may in some cases be fully and genuinely impossible.

The incautious observer may remark that this situation of disjunction is not any more remarkable than the recognition that a brick dropped on my foot is not necessarily experienced as pain by you and that a brick dropped on your foot is not necessarily experienced as pain by me. Ie, that the subjective is fully and absolutely bounded by, and localized to, the physicality of the body, and that therefore all such issues about the relation of knowledge and understanding are only so many semantic tricks.

They may even argued further that this physicalist interpretation is well supported by the recently emerging science of neurobiology, particularly insofar as there are now known many increasingly well identified 'neural correlates' -- places of correspondence between changes in specific areas and aspects of brain activity and changes in the subjective experience of ones own consciousness.

And yet this way of thinking misses the point completely.

The mere fact of their being neural correlates, of which no effort of contest will be attempted here, actually says absolutely nothing at all about what makes the hard problem hard. To see why, it is merely necessary to show that the nature of the consideration itself embeds a set of assumptions which end up begging the question -- as fully presuming that which is attempting to be proved, and that by principle of identity, the notion of neural correlates is of no consequence (1).

For a model to see how this is so, consider the known relation that exists between hardware and software. A complicated software program, executing on a computer, does not do so in just any single place, or at any one single time. Rather, the structure of the program, the operating system, other programs, etc, are all at run-time, spread throughout physical memory of the system. In that sense, if we were to poke and prod the memory chips, reading their contents here and there, sometimes changing their values, then the perspective obtained and the results observed, in regards to the behavior of the entire system, would be not so different, functionally and characteristically, from that obtained by the observations of a neuroscientist, looking at a brain.

In both cases, the systems involved are very complex, and how changes each location in physical memory (or with respect to particular neuron cells in the brain) corresponds to changes in the overall visible and evident behavior of the system (what is on the screen, what messages are sent from one computer to another, etc, or alternately, what a person subjectively experiences) will in each case be indirect, sometimes systemic, and at least non-obvious, even though the reality of their being such connections between hardware and software is unambiguous.

However, what is not often remarked on is that the very fact that software programs are not considered to be mindful, receptive to and expressive of declarations regarding the notions of consciousness, having of 'actual' intentionality, etc, is the very reason why neural correlates as a 'testing methodology' is not actually very relevant or useful to real considerations of the deep nature of the hard problem. If a system that is not conscious has functional characteristics and behavioral aspects which are exactly similar in manifestation to a system that is regarded as conscious, as ones own self having a 1st person point of view, mind, intentionality etc, then it is clear that those specific aspects, behaviors, etc, are not actually relevant to distinguishing what the notions of consciousness, mind, and intention, actually mean.

What is needed is a distinction, something that is evident in one type of system -- consciousness bearing systems -- that is NOT evident in the other type (non-consciousness bearing), or which is evidentantually in some way characteristically differently. Any such difference, where identified, physically measurable, etc, could be used to better characterize what is meant by 'consciousness', 'mind', and intentionality in a functional and epistemic sense. Otherwise, without any such distinction being known (yet), the best that can be asserted is that the fact of neural correlates, in themselves, actually tell us nothing about the hard problem, since both machines and minds, from that perspective, look exactly the same, in theory, function, and practice. Yet discarding the notions of mind and intention as meaningless, and that therefore there is not actually any hard problem at all, is to have ignored and disregarded too much.

The absence of physically observed difference between 'mind bearing systems' and 'non mind bearing systems' does not mean that such differences do not exist. It simply means that we do not know about them yet, or that we are looking at these concepts in the wrong sort of way. The fact of neural correlates is not a license to declare that 'mind bearing systems' are therefore an illusion, and moreover, more importantly, such measured phenomena is not in itself an explanation of why, in our own personal subjective experience, we have a sense of 'being uniquely ourselves', and not some other.

That we could experience the results of actions on neural correlates is therefore ultimately no different than the fact that we would experience pain if someone dropped a brick on our own foot. Yet this fact of the possibility of correlated events, of various kinds of origin, is not the important question. That question is actually much more about accounting for why this event -- the 'having of experience' -- is more definitely occurring in a 1st person manner, as personal, than it is ever regarded as being in the 3rd person manner, as just so many informational signals moving through 'stuff'. Why is it that we do have experience, intention, mind, seemingly bound to a sense of self and presence, at all?

On a microscopic level, we can model each kind of event, in both computers and in brains, as being a large scale complex composition of multiple casual signal flows. Yet in this there is no implication that mere complexity alone, mere volumes of information, are even a necessary, let alone sufficient, precondition for consciousness.

Therefore, while physical systems (like computers), and organic systems (ones bearing consciousness, mind, and intention), are both 'event mediated', something about how we model those events is characteristically different. Depending on what sorts of systems we are considering, (ie, with respect to our modeling of events), the way in which that difference appears is distinguished in regard to how we consider the nature of time.

When we think about events in systems like computers, we do so from the outside, looking in, wherein theoretically at least, and often also practically, we can access and measure the signals at any location, and with respect to any state. Ultimately, in every purely causal system, every state is in explicit relation to every other state, and therefore, a model of the inter-relations of all states is perfectly defined and definable, deterministically, for all points along its 'evolutionary trajectory'. The entire sequence of an operating program may as well be rendered, diagrammed, or recorded like a movie on a DVD disk or VHS tape, available completely, statically, and all at once in all available details, for all of time.

Yet when we think about systems like selves, we do so from the inside, looking out. Practically, and moreover, not even theoretically, we do not automatically have access to, and can assume free access to, any other moments of time than that one with which we are currently, presently, and locally associated with. We do not have access to any of the available 'universe states', except in proportion to their being proximate to our local past, and even then, only in a very limited way. The activities and events that might be occurring, even in an infinitesimally short duration into the future, are fully, completely, and irreducibly inaccessible to ourselves in the now. It does not matter how close -- how short the duration -- in the future, or in the past, any given event or occurrence may be, we only and strictly have access to what is occurring in the now.

The one thing that for sure distinguishes 1st person personal perspective from the 3rd person impersonal perspective of physics, is time. Only and exactly that.

And figuring out the essential nature of time is hard.

In the personal sense, the 'being of time' lives on the very boundary of -- the mediator of -- what is known, knowable yet unknown, and what is forever, fully unknowable (ie, the absolute past or the absolute future -- everything in the else-when). Yet in the impersonal sense, the notion of time does not 'exist' at all -- it is fully illusionary, and therefore, it seems, cannot even be truly regarded as a target of study in any serious, scientific manner. Either way, 1st person or 3rd person, the concept of time cannot be regarded as other than elusive.

And to say 'time is elusive' is to significantly understate the rather extreme level of difficulty -- of 'hardness'. Beyond just the practical acknowledgement that on the scales of the universe, the time of our lives is exceedingly short, fleeting, and ephemeral, there is the more particular question of how would even be possible to figure out the nature of time, to make it an object of scientific study, when the very method of science itself -- the infamous 'scientific method', however conceived -- inherently assumes the notion of itself in its very practice.

What meaning can be put to the notion of 'performing an experiment' so as to 'obtain measurable information' about the 'state of the universe' if all three of these concepts have already presupposed the 1st person perspective of time? Moreover the requirement of 'observability', which in itself implies and assumes a 1st person perspective, the notion of 'repeatability' is also inherent in all of the very most basic assessments of the meaning of the scientific method. As something which is ultimately an epistemic practice, the requirement that we must assume a background foundational assumption of the concept of time, even when considering just the notion of 'repeatability', must be fully accounted for. Is there any sense at all in which the method of the scientific method can be considered as being fully atemporal?

Yet this last is not actually a scientific question, and moreover, it can never be so. For within the domain of science, it would not be valid to attempt to consider the means and correctness of the applicability and basis in truth of the scientific method using the means and methods of the scientific method itself. Within the realm of theory, such circularity is necessarily forbidden, for it would be fully improper to prior assume that which it is that one is attempting to prove: that the scientific method cannot be used as a means to establish the correctness of the applicability of the scientific method. For its own truth, it must reach to some deeper basis, and yet no such deeper basis, in itself, can be considered 'valid knowledge', as at least 'scientific'.

As such, more than just being 'a hard problem', reconciling the notion of time within the domain of science is actually fully, fundamentally, and characteristically impossible. Therefore, it is suggested that the totality of the 'hard problem' is actually subsumed in the following three questions: why is there (why does there seem to be) a moment called 'now'?; why do these moments seem to be in a succession, moving in a certain "direction"?; and why does this this succession, in the 'direction that it has', seem to move at the 'rate' that it does?.

Levels and Degrees of Realization

Another concept that is frequently, and apparently irresolvably connected with the nature of minds, self, consciousness, intentionality, the subjective, etc, is the notion of 'choice'. Insofar as much of the philosophical debate regarding the nature of the relation between mind and body has historically been concerned with the notions and meanings of 'free will', 'choice', 'agency', 'intentionality', etc, whether such exists or is 'real' or not, what nature it has, etc, then it is also important to consider these concepts in connection with the 'hard problem'.

In this context, the particular dilemma that occurs is how to reconcile the notion of 'freeness', self determination, etc, as subjectively experienced, 1st person, with the notion of 'fixed', as defined by the apparently complete mathematics of the 3rd person physicalist perspective. If someone were to posit free will, then they are effectively also positing that there is somewhere, somehow, and somewhen, some (any) change that occurs (anywhere, or anywhen in the universe) which is also not causal, not caused, and in that way, not deterministic, which as a concept eventually extends to include the notions of 'not rational", 'not reasonable', irrational, and therefore 'just plain wrong', etc.

In this sense, it seems that the deck is stacked against us, for it seems inherent, on this basis, the notion of choice, freedom, etc, must be inherently illusionary, despite our 1st person experience of seeming, despite our dependance on such notions in all of the considerations of ethics, morality, law and order in a popular civil context, and even though, moreover, that such concepts of 'free choice' and 'subjective' are irreducably embedded as assumptions into the method of science. For how is science to be 'conducted' if not somehow assuming that there are somehow other alternate possibilities in the manner by which the universe can be (could have been) constructed, of which we determine "God's choice" by means of actual physical experiment? And yet this leaves us in the somewhat paradoxical position of trying to account for how the method of science, which is inherently a 1st person practice, results in a kind of 3rd person objective knowledge (ie, an epistemic claim), which is then presumed to be more 'real' and 'truthful' than the practice from which it finds its origin (an ontological claim).

Foundational science, as a body of knowledge (a 3rd person object, impersonal) depends on a practice of verification (a 1st person practice, performed by a subject, agent, with intentionality, etc). As such, the notion of 'truth' is actually more inherently attached to the practice than it is to the outcome. In both civil law and natural Law, the 1st person perspective is more basic than the 3rd person perspective, in regards to ground truth, and everything else is regarded as 'just so much metaphysics' -- as speculative, and as something outside the bounds of the 'hard sciences'.

As such, given that there are strong injunctions (claims) in both directions -- that the 1st person perspective is not real and that only the 3rd person perspective is valid/truthful, and alternately, that the 3rd person perspective actually depends on the 1st person perspective, as the ultimate establishment of what is meant by 'truthful', 'scientific', 'sound, valid, and reasonable', etc -- is is clear that an even deeper level of conceptual tools and methods will be necessary to reconcile these claims; some sort of metaphysical theory of truth will eventually be needed.

In particular, it is to be recognized that the two perspectives, 1st person and 3rd person, are operating at very different levels and possibly in different ways. Whether or not 1st and 3rd are to be eventually reconcilable as method perspectives, it can at least be recognized that they each operate at very different scales. The 3rd person perspective views the universe in terms of simpler and singular typed relationships, mathematically modeled, and usually at the scales of the absolutely microscopic (Standard Model Particle interactions, theory of Quantum Mechanisms, etc) or at the scales of the absolutely macroscopic (ie, inclusively, as when thinking of everything in the universe as being governed by Quantum theory, Relativity theory, etc). Whereas the 1st person perspective views the universe experimentally, in terms of measurements and information resolved ultimately at the scales of the mesoscopic -- ie, in terms of persons, brains, using the theories of Newton, thermodynamics, electromagnetism, chemistry, biology, ecology, etc.

Therefore, the question of how to reconcile choice, agency, intention, etc with the evidence of physical determinism, (ie, as described in the practical and otherwise very well verified theories and models put forward by nearly every scientist since Newton), needs to be resolved in terms of different operational levels of scale. In those terms, the situation is something like a 'epistemic sandwich': two layers hard bread, in the form of a 3rd person perspective at the scales of the macroscopic and microscopic, surrounding a goey center, a 1st person perspective at the scale of the mesoscopic, which is attempting 'to reach out' into the periphery and answer the big questions; 'why am I here?', 'what is all of this for?', 'why does anything exist at all?'.

As such, it is to be noticed that the notion of 'casualty', operating at the level of the mesoscopic (brains, bio-organic neural networks, software programs running on real computers, etc), is strictly and fully conceptually distinct from from the notion of 'determinism', operating at the level of the extreme microscopic (the interactions of Standard Model particle physics as described mathematically), or at the level of the extreme macroscopic (the eventual heat death of the universe) (2).

In this regard, while it is reasonable to consider the notion of 'choice' (as a proxy for 'free will', 'agency', 'intentionality', etc) in contradistinction with the notion of 'causality', and while it is also reasonable to consider whether the universe is 'deterministic' or 'non-deterministic', it is not therefore valid or reasonable to consider that either set of these concepts, (inclusive of the element concepts themselves) is in some/any direct relation to the other set of concepts. Choice, Change, and Causality, are at the same 'epistemic level' (a proxy for the concept of scale), whereas completed determinism and completed in-determinism (ie, pure randomness) are concepts at a different epistemic level.

Therefore, to properly relate these two levels, and therefore have some basis on which to reconcile these relationships -- "is our reality fully causal or are some elements of agency real?" and "does reality admit of free choice?", etc -- we need some sort of 'impedance matching geometry' between the scales of the macroscopic and the scales of the microscopic. For it can be see that even the notion and the concept of time appears to operate very differently, depending on the scale of the consideration.

Choice and the Bell Theorem

Searching for an example of the kind of necessary coupling that occurs between the scale of the microscopic (3rd person) and the scale of the macroscopic (1st person) finds the work of John Conway and Simon Kochen and their paper "The Strong FreeWill Theorem". While obstensively that published work is about formally and finally precluding any possibility of the development of an internally consistent theory of hidden variables in Quantum Mechanics (QM), there are other important layers of inherent implication.

In particular, there is developed a relation between the notions of 'choice', as evident as an assumption in the practice of the scientific method, and the notion of 'in-determinism', as a statement about the prior existential state of an entangled particle (3). On the basis of an actually experimentally verified effect, and insofar as we regard that QM theory is correct, there is made an strong connection between an epistemic process at the level of the 1st person, to an ontological claim about reality, at the level of the 3rd person. That is a remarkable result, and is of particular importance regarding our current inquiry.

Rather than attempting to establish whether the notion of counterfactual definiteness is applicable in a general sense, which would be an involved debate in itself, we can instead consider that all that need be regarded as established is that there is now a relation of correspondence between the occurrence of the concept of 'choice', on the part of the scientist doing science, and of a kind of inherent 'hard randomness', on the part of the particles and interactions that ostensibly compose the substrate of reality. Note that this is not to assert whether both 'experienced choice' and 'intrinsic randomness' are "true", but rather to assert that both of these are either co-occurring, each at their respective scale levels, or that neither of them are occurring at either level.

Why is this important? Although there is no formal conclusion stated in terms of whether 1st/3rd realities are either intentional or non-intentional, it is the case that in either situation, either way, a strong statement has also actually been made about the nature of time. Insofar as an assumption of the temporal is inherently an aspect of 'making a choice' and insofar there is also an assumption of temporality in the means and methods of 'measuring a particle state', and thus of 'resolving' it to a definite state, as a kind of irreversible transform from 'previously unknown' to 'afterwards knowable', then it becomes possible to actually compare and contrast these two particular assumptions about the nature of time in a formal and definite, conceptually fixed, way.

Time, as considered at the scale of the mesoscopic, is considered entropically, as being the statistical results of enormous numbers of single particle interactions, at elevated temperatures, chaotically composed into systems of such high complexity and information content as to be effectively unmeasurable and incalculable, in terms of purely QM micro-states. And yet Time, when considered at the scale of the microscopic, when in the process of measuring the spin state of one particle, representative of a single entangled system, is regarded in terms of a pure asymmetry of information flow. This concept of time is not to be regarded in terms of any sort of deeper entropic state (4).

In other words, we have identified that there is a necessity to regard that there is a real concept of a non-entropic arrow of time, at a physical level.

Inaofar as it is regarded that the macroscopic is composed out of the microscopic, then it is also to be regarded that the non-entropic arrow of time is actually be more fundamental one, in a strict physicalist sense, and that the 'ordinary' entropic arrow of time experienced at the level of brains is, if anything, in addition to or 'on top of', the more fundamental non-entropic arrow. Therefore, in our considerations as to the essential nature of time, it is only the non-entopic versions and concepts of that arrow that we need regard as important.

However, insofar as the 'reality' of the entropic arrow of time is uncontested as 'real', at least at a 1st person perspective, and insofar as this 1st person arrow of time has been put into a kind of strict correspondence with the 3rd person non-entropic arrow at the scale of the microscopic by formalism of the Conway and Kochen paper, then therefore, we must also accept that this non-entropic arrow at the foundational level of QM is actually also real, applicable, etc, in some final way.

Notice that these considerations, regarding the nature of time, would remain valid regardless of any particular assessment as to whether our 1st person sense/experience of 'subjective choice', 'agency', 'intention', etc, was the purely the result of the mutual chaotic motion of all of the compositional elements of our brains, environments, etc, or even whether our 3rd person assessment is that at some deep level the nature of practical interaction reality is inherently and irreducibly random, indeterminate, mathematically irrational, etc. (5).

On Choice and Randomness

From the forgoing, we have established some important relations between the nature of the concept of time, as it occurs on different levels of scale and in different modes of 'person', and certain other concepts, also occurring at distinct levels, like 'choice', 'causality', 'determinism', and 'randomness'. Entangled with the acceptance of non-entropic arrow of time as real at the level of the 3rd person microscopic, we find also an assessment that that microscopic substrate of reality is also, at least to some partial extent, non-deterministic and hard-random (ie, that no concept of a definite particle state as 'ontologically existing' prior to measurement, can be substantiated, since by definition it is explicitly the case that there is no valid epistemic process by to establish that ontological assumption).

However, even with the acceptance of fundamental in-determinism at within the level of a 3rd person material reality, and that therefore, in at lest some respects, there are 'un-caused' changes within reality, that fact in itself is not equivalent to a thereby established statement of 'truth' of a notion of 'intentionality' and 'free choice' at the level of the 1st person experience.

As such, there are two alternatives in how the notions of 'choice' and 'intentionality' may be regarded. In one view, the sense of the 'freedom' of 'felt choice' could be regarded as directly equivalent to, and a direct result of, randomness, and of our innate pattern seeking abilities to become engaged in the service of 'rationalizing' our random (unpredictable) actions to ourselves as being 'chosen'. In another view, we can regard that the term 'randomness' is a misnomer, insofar as it is at least potentially the case that all apparently random states are actually cross correlated -- entangled -- in some unknowable and unmeasurable way, and therefore potentially meaningful, even if such meaning is largely likely to be fully and/or completely unknown to all others outside of the subjective self.

Therefore, the notion of whether we regard choice, intention, and/or randomness as inherently meaningful or meaningless is more about whether one prefers an orientation which is based in the 1st person perspective or in the 3rd person perspective, since at the level of brains, the specific selection of particular states out of the range of all possible states is both unobservable and non-computable, even in principle, whenever fine details of what is happening at the level of the microscopic is eventually influential as to the particulars of what happens at the scale of the mesoscopic. The more sensitive and delicate the balance of the brain, the more unknowable the nature of the mind.

As such and in summary, the relation between a 1st person perspective on reality and 3rd person perspective on reality is not one of mutual contradiction, but is actually one of both perspectives having a single common temporal ground, even if differing areas of utility and application, how the notion of randomness and determinism is treated, etc. In many areas, to have a predictive model, it is helpful to 'factor out' the notion of time so as to be able to enter 'initial conditions' into a well defined mathematical model and 'read off' an anticipation of an (presumed eventually) measurable future state. To agree that there is significant utility in this 3rd person mode of relation, is not to require that there is also an attendant ontological claim that such methods are the 'only' ways in which systems of utility can be established (as to assert that no form of 1st person thinking could have utility), or moreover, to make a stronger ontological claim that such theories of QM are a final and complete basis for reality itself. Neither of these 3rd ontological assumptions make sense, particularly insofar as they themselves would need to, ultimately, be grounded in terms of a 1st person practice in any case. The use of '3rd person systems' is grounded in, and embedded in, a 1st personal temporal reality, rather than the reverse.

[1] The Principle of Identity: 'that which is indistinguishable must be the same'. In other words, if two concepts are in every functional respect respect equivalent, if between two things there is no possible way to distinguish them, even in principle, then those things/concepts must be the same, in both action and instance.

[2] For more about how/why it is necessary and reasonable to consider the concept/theory of causality as fully distinct than theory of determinism, see my notes on Non Polarization.

[3] A copy of the "The Strong Free Will Theorem", by John Conway and Simon Kochen, can be found at and Arxiv. For a summary, review the notes provided at Wikipedia and The Information Philosopher.

[4] The posit of the MIN assumption effectively incorporates the notion of an asymmetric temporality the form of an impossibility of backward causation, as well as a recognition of the fact that the scientists performing the experiment will be operating in a 1st person mode of relation. The fact of this being the case is not problematic insofar as is the correspondence between the 1st person entropic arrow of irreversability being placed in explicit conjunction with a more fundamental notion of strict temporal irreversability in the form of a full asymmetric information acecssability that is of specific interest.

[5] Ie, that particle entropy would have to be defined in terms of hidden variables. The entire point of the Conway and Kochen paper was to show that the notion of hidden variables in particle states is inconsistent with the actual results of actual experiments, unless assuming further that the definite chaotic state of the observer was fully corresponded, in detail, with the actual specific (presumed) definite internal state, in complete detail, with that specific particle. If we are that committed to an effort to avoid randomness at a particle level, then we would also have to accept that the mind of the experimenter and the 'mind' of the particle were somehow directly corresponded to one another, so as to obtain the result that both were mutually fully deterministic, even though operating at vastly different scales and within completely different contextual situations. Insofar as we can likely assume that most rational physicists would eschew such 'psychic' connections, we can therefore also regard it as given that the allowance of a notion of 'entropic randomness' on the part of the experimenter would also require a notion of 'state in-determinism' on the part of particles, if the theory of QM was also to be accepted.

For a more specific and formal rendition of this argument, consult these EGS notes.