What is the difference between a 'truth' and a Truth
A lowercase 't' truth is something which is generally true, ie, invariant, for a given domain.
An uppercase 'T' Truth is something which is necessarily invariant for all domains, ie, inherent in the nature of conception itself.
It is a bit similar to the difference between a 'law', as understood and applied within a specific world, and a 'principle',
a form or idea which would potentially be applicable in any world.
What would be an example of a capital T Truth?.
Anything -- any principle or form -- which is intrinsic to the nature of relationship itself.
Any aspect of a relationship which is necessarily inherent in all relationships.
The being or reality of such things, these intrinsics, is a capital T truth.
How can we know that such things are True?
As in, "how can we know (any) truth?".
The basic construction is to 1st consider that the relationship between truth and falsity is itself neither 'true' nor 'false'.
In effect, there are necessarily three ontological categories: truth, false, and the relationship of true and false.
Without the contrast of true, as distinct from false, as being different from false, there is no concept of being true.
Hence the relationship between truth and falsity is in some sense more basic than even the notion, the concept, of truth itself.
The notions of truth and falsity are abstract concepts in much the same manner in which numbers, the integers, are abstract concepts.
While there can be any number of examples, physical and otherwise, of 'a set which has 6 elements', the notion of '6' is itself abstract.
Two sets are regarded as having 'the same number' if the elements of each set can be put into a one to one relationship with the elements of the other.
Similarly, to identify something as 'true' there is ultimately a sense in which all things which are true are the same in being different from that which is false,
and that all that is false is different from that which is true.
Therefore, the notions of sameness and difference, ie of relationship, are the necessary core, the foundations, on which all other
notions such as truth, falsity, number, etc, are built.
The 2nd aspect to observe is that this same pattern holds when considering the relationship between the content and context.
The relationship between content and context is neither an element of the content nor an element of the context.
Insofar as the relationship between content and context distinguishes them, that relationship is in a certain sense more basic than anything which is either content or context.
These three concepts, content, context, and the relationship between content and context, are distinct and yet never occur separately.
The 3rd observation is that this same pattern also holds when considering the relationship between subject and object.
Insofar as 'the subjective' can be considered as 'the perceiver' and 'the objective' as 'the perceived' that the action of the relationship between can be considered as 'perception'.
The event of perception is neither 'the thing' which is the perceiver, nor is it 'the thing' which is the perceived.
Considered in the most minimal possible way, the most microscopic interaction possible in/within a single instant,
the three concepts of perciever, perception, and perceived are distinct, inseparable, and non-interchangeable.
At this point, we have the absolute minimum necessary ingredients to identify what it means to 'perceive a truth'.
There is an implied notion of a perceiver, and that the truth which is perceived, is/are a content within a context.
In any situation in which truthfulness is implied, the concept of falseness is also implied.
Similarly when declaring that something is a content, there is the necessary implication of a 'domain' which is its context.
Therefore, in effect, the concept of 'knowing a truth' is to declare that there is a specific relationship between
subject, object, content, context, sameness and difference.
In effect, the relationship that is between true and false, content and context, and object and subject, is the same.
In being the same, a kind of sameness, or invariance, it is itself a content which is itself perceivable (within the context of this description).
However, in that this invariance, the 'process of knowing a truth' is general to all events in all domains and with respect to all selves (all contexts in which there is content), it is a principle of truth.
In this way, it is directly identifiable as being a capital T-Truth,
inclusive of those concepts of relationship (of any comparison, interaction, or measurement) which have been identified as intrinsics
(sameness, difference, content, context, subject, object).
Many people have claimed to "know an absolute Truth", and have been proven false before.
It is generally not
a good idea to believe in any sort of absolute Truths -- that all truth is relative.
As constructed, the concepts as presented are not relative to some domain or to any particular self.
In this specific sense, the ideas involved in the nature of relationship,
of the intrinsics involved in any concept of making the comparison as needed to identify something as true or false,
are necessarily considered as general, as invariant with respect to selves and domains.
In effect, the argument subsumes even the consideration of the relationship between the relative and the absolute.
The relationship between the concept of the relative, and the concept of the absolute, is itself neither
wholly a relative relationship nor an absolute one: it is the conjunction and the distinction between them.
The relationship between that which is related is still more basic than that which is related,
even when the notion of 'relative' is itself sometimes considered as a placeholder or proxy for relationship in itself.
It would still be the case that the notion of the distinction -- the relationship -- between having a relationship and not having a relationship,
is in some irreducible sense, more basic.
If the language of absolute an relative must be used, the narrowest and simplest assertion that can be made
is that the Truth as stated is 'Absolutely Relative' and/or 'Relatively Absolute', and that omitting either
of these terms would therefore be "less than Truth" (ie, incomplete, or 'not wholly true').
In what sense is this different than Dogma?
For example, what happens if there was no content (or no context)?
Is there any sense in which this notion of Truth is itself mutable?.
Dogma is more correctly associated with blindness -- with not seeing or not knowing or understanding -- than it is with seeing.
In institutional practice, dogma is either the result of an absence of evidence, or worse, a willful disregard of any possible evidence.
The strength of the argument is based on the direct identification with the process of seeing/knowing itself -- of all
In that respect, it is the very antithesis of dogma, in the most ultimate manner possible.
Not only is it asked that a clarity of perception occur, it is asked that there also be clarity about the process of perception/knowing itself.
A more complete acceptance of any possible evidence could not be asked for.
However, to hypothesize that there "is" relationship, but that there is no content or no context, is inadmissible (a hypothesis of evidence is not in itself evidence).
Such action would be similar to responding "but what if 2+2=5?" to an argument using arithmetic logic as its basis.
In what sense is there a coherent concept of relationship, of content, or of context, under these circumstances?.
While there is an acknowledged difference between an attempt to attack the validity of an argument vs an attack on its soundness,
to simply contradict a premise without offering an alternative 'system' in which the notion of '2+2=5' is valid, is neither
offering evidence against the soundness nor is it demonstrating an absence of validity (ie, identifying an error of logic).
For example, to posit 'imagine a completely empty universe' as an instance of 'context with out content' is to have already posited at least several somethings:
the concept of emptiness, the concept of a universe, and concept of imagination (itself as a process), the concept of a 'self' doing the imagining,
which is itself a kind of context for the 'event of imagining' as a content.
Similar results hold for trying to imaging something which is 'before time and space' and which exists 'absolutely nowhere and no-when' (a 'content without context').
In all of this, the relationship between content and context, and of these three as intrinsically inseparable, is well established.
Such example is therefore evidence of, rather than evidence against, the Truth as presented.
Therefore, insofar as the nature of perception (and of knowing) is not about any specific content or any specific context (domain),
and is invariant with respect to all of these, and to all percievers, the intrinsics of perception (relationship/interaction)
cannot be regarded as mutable.
They are, in that sense exactly, an Absolute Truth, by definition.