Metaphysics is an inquiry into the nature of the relation between self and reality.
It is organized thinking that describes common aspects
of the relations between self and reality.
Physics is organized thinking that attempts to explain
the common correlated content
of the perceptions of many selves
in the context of a particular physical world.
A metaphysics is not a physics.
Each has its own means, ends and values.
Although metaphysics is often considered as an extension of physics,
it is more correct to assert that physics is a particular
instance of a more general metaphysics.
Physics (explanations) is an answer to a Why question.
Technology (prediction) is an answer to a How question.
Metaphysics is an answer to a What question.
Physics and technology (when combined together as per the scientific method)
refer to a collection of theories,
and are thus subject to falsifiability and disproof.
Metaphysics, as a description of the nature of meaning, measurement, and interaction,
is not a theory, is not scientific, and is not falsifiable,
in the conventional sense of these terms.
A description (metaphor) is evaluated on the basis of significance, completeness, and relevance,
rather than on the basis of a fixed procedure or methodology (a form of logic).
A true metaphysics makes no predictions and provides no explanations;
it is merely a description of the foundations of being in terms of patterns
of correlations of meaningfulness (a system of metaphors and definitions).
Physics is the study of the interactions within a given domain. Metaphysics is the study of the relationships between domains.
The ideas and concepts considered herein and hereafter are therefore collectively statement of metaphysics,
rather than of physics, when properly regarded.
So as to obtain greater descriptive generality,
the notions of 'self' and 'reality' as used in the definition of metaphysics
can be expanded (re-normalized) to 'subjective' and 'objective' respectively
In this same manner, it is also seen to be more correct to use the term 'interaction'
when considering 'what happens between' self and reality,
rather than just the static notion of 'relation'.
As such, the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity are defined in terms of the relationship between self and reality,
and that the notion of relationship is expanded to include the notions of 'interaction', 'perception', and 'expression'.
That which is external to the boundary of self and world,
aka 'that which is objective',
has the nature of the omniscient modality.
That which is internal to the boundary of self and world,
aka 'that which is subjective',
has the nature of the transcendent modality.
The meaning of objectivity has common basis with the meaning of
'that which is perceived or is perceivable' (physical content).
The meaning of subjectivity has common basis with the meaning of
'that which is invisible or is transparent' (non-physical context).
Objectivity is defined in terms of comparable forms.
Subjectivity is defined in terms of non-comparable feelings.
Objectivity and subjectivity are degrees/metrics, not states of being or condition.
The very event of perception (observation) itself has
(cannot not have) both subjective aspects and objective aspects.
Each perception and observation,
and each expression and communication event,
must (cannot not) create and define both the objective and the subjective
Everything (and every process) has both a subjective and an objective aspect.
There is no objectivity that does not end in subjectivity.
There is no subjectivity that does not end in objectivity.
Nothing (no relation, no interaction, no being, etc) can be purely objective or subjective.
Objectivity is not an attribute of any single perception.
Objectivity can only be associated with clusters of related perceptions.
Perception, observation, experience refer to a single/simple condition of being, without aspect;
whereas objectivity can only be considered as an aspect of complexes of many related perceptions.
The concepts and the meanings of
(objective) 'being' (to be objective), 'to be real', and 'to exist',
are considered identically distinct and non-interchangeable concepts.
The concepts of being, reality and of existence are dissimilar in meaning and definition.
Each of these terms has a different semantic basis; are not synonymous.
To say anything about any one is to have asserted little or nothing with respect to the other two.
The scope of application of each is distinct from that of the other two.
To assert existence implies both necessary actuality and necessary potentiality.
With any existing thing, there must always be at least a possibility of secondary
or additional interactions within that same context
with any and all other existing things.
The meaning of the term 'existence' is always relative to a particular world
(even if it is considered independent of any specific self).
The term existence cannot be considered to have meaning without implicit
reference to a world (shared objective context)
The term objectivity has no meaning without implicit
reference to some (specific) self (shared subjective context)
even if it is considered independently of any specific world.
The meaning of 'to exist' is to make an assertion
that the omniscient modal aspects of a given set of interactions
are common and shared for all of those interactions.
The meaning of 'objectivity' is to make an assertion
that the transcendent modal aspects of a given set of interactions
are common and shared for all of those interactions.
The meaning of the term 'objectivity' is in reference to certain
characteristics of a (large) collection of perceptual interactions, relative to some implicit self.
The meaning of the term 'exists'
is in reference to that which is presumed to have (at least the
potentiality of) an actuality without any perceptual interactions
at all (zero observations).
Objectivity is the product of the degree of
1) the intensity of the self-to-world interaction,
2) the degree of macroscopic consistency of the self-to-world interaction, and
3) the degree of microscopic potentiality in the self-to-world interaction
The meaning of the term 'real'
is in reference to the beingness of a single instance of an interaction (exactly one).
To be real is interdependent
with considerations/references to domains/worlds and selves/observers.
This is in contrast with the notions of both objectivity (inherently
involves many interactions) and existence (inherently involves no interactions).
All perceptions (comparisons in themselves) regardless of their 'type', are simply real.
The stable patterns of comparisons of perception are reality.
All Interactions are Real.
Reality (an experience of a world) is constructed out of consistent sets of comparisons of those
interactions (consensus, objectivity).
The notion of 'Reality' refers to the beingness of an instance of a set of interactions (perceptions, observations, experiences).
Multiple instances of that which is 'real' together form the class of that which is 'reality'.
The notion of 'to be real' cannot be further analyzed.
The term 'real' can only be applied to the identity of the beingness of the interaction itself.
The term 'reality', then, can refer only to the quality of the instance-beingness of a (an arbitrary) collection of interactions.
The concept of 'real' (perception) is inherently simple (an instance).
The concept of 'reality' (experience) is inherently complex (a class).
Interaction is simple. Reality is complex.
Only the content of that set of comparisons 'exists'.
The context of those comparisons (the self), does not exist,
although it is an inseparable aspect of all that is real.
The concept of 'real' refers to an intrinsic aspect of interaction.
The concept of reality refers to an intrinsic of stable (with respect
to the subjective/self) patterns of comparisons of interaction.
All experience and expression (interaction) is known and understood in the terms of choice, change, and cause.
The beingness and reality of (the doing of) a/any/the/all worlds/selves
is composed completely and entirely of only change, causality, and choice.
Change, causality, and choice are the composition and basis of all-that-is.
The notion of 'real/reality' is defined, and has its basis in (only) change, causality, and choice.
Causality is defined as the subjective perception (context)
of a consistency between two objective contents.
Choice is defined as the objective expression (content)
of a consistency between two subjective contexts.
Change refers to the continuity of content and asymmetry of
context of the interaction/definition of the subjective and objective.
Change has the nature of the immanent modality.
Causality has the nature of the omniscient modality.
Choice has the nature of the transcendent modality.
The notion of Change is deeply connected to the concepts of complexity and consciousness, which are also of the immanent modality.
The notion of Causality is deeply connected to the concepts of actuality and conservation, which are also of the omniscient modality.
The notion of Choice is deeply connected to the concepts of potentiality and evolution, which are also of the transcendent modality.
The object domain is described in terms of interactions.
The correspondence domain is described in terms of comparisons.
The model domain is described in terms of relations.
In Practice empirical measurement happens only at the scales of the mesoscopic.
Extrapolation of theory is used to consider the scales of the microscopic and that of the macroscopic.
As such, effective theory is developed from the middle outward,
rather than from the top down (philosophies of idealism and 'design')
or from the bottom up (philosophies of realism and 'causal assembly').
Within a language domain (within communication), there are exactly six classes of question:
'how', 'why', 'who', 'what', 'where' and 'when':
Questions of who are resolved in terms of
a class of the subjective.
Questions of what are resolved in terms of
a class of the objective.
Questions of how are resolved in terms of
an instance of a subjective content.
Questions of why are resolved in terms of
an instance of a subjective context.
Questions of when are resolved in terms of
an instance of an objective content.
Questions of where are resolved in terms of
an instance of an objective context.
Questions of why, how and who are always relative (in relation to) to a particular self.
Questions of what, where and when are always relative (in relation to) to a particular world.
Questions of why and how
have the nature of the transcendent modality.
Questions of who and what
have the nature of the immanent modality.
Questions of when and where
have the nature of the omniscient modality.
The six types of question have direct one-to-one correspondences with the
six types of primary domain metrics.
A why type question corresponds to
a consideration of possibility.
A how type question corresponds to
a consideration of probability.
A who type question corresponds to
a consideration of force (agency).
A what type question corresponds to
a consideration of mass (inertia/pattern).
A where type question corresponds to
a consideration of space.
A when type question corresponds to
a consideration of time.
The six question types group into three axis pairs which represent convolutions of two other primary concepts.
These pairs are abstraction and instruction, the subjective and the objective, and the spatial and the temporal.
An answer to a question of why
always refers to an abstraction.
A 'why type assertion' is one which,
given a specified instructed eventity X,
an abstract eventity Y.
An answer to a question of how
always refers to an instruction.
A 'how type assertion' is one which,
given a specified abstract eventity X,
an instruction eventity Y.
An answer to a question of who
always refers to that which is subjective.
A 'who type assertion' is one which,
given a specified objective eventity X,
a subjective eventity Y.
An answer to a question of what
always refers to that which is objective.
A 'what type assertion' is one which,
given a specified subjective eventity X,
an objective eventity Y.
An answer to a question of where
always refers to that which is spatial.
A 'where type assertion' is one which,
given a specified temporal eventity X,
provides/ specifies/ corresponds/ defines
a spatial eventity Y.
An answer to a question of when
always refers to that which is temporal.
A 'when type assertion' is one which,
given a specified spatial eventity X,
provides/ specifies/ corresponds/ defines
a temporal eventity Y.
The process and being of the questions of how and why, of abstraction and instruction,
expression and perception, and possibility and probability, refer to (and are
specified in terms of) relations of similarity between domains.
The process and being of the questions of who and what, of the objective and the subjective,
statement and self, and inertia and force, refer to (and are specified in terms of)
relations of inclusion between eventities and domains.
The process and being of the questions of when and where, of space and time, and the
proscriptive and the descriptive, refer to (and are specified in terms of) relations
of proximity between eventities.
The meaning and essence of perception, as that which crosses the boundary of self,
is the same as the essence and meaning of comparison
Perception and expression (each individually and together)
are considered to be notions of the most basic type of interaction and relationship between self and reality.
The notions of relation, interaction, and comparison are basic primitive concepts.
As per Axiom I, they are the ultimate coordinating basis of the
descriptions, metaphors, and definitions of this metaphysics and
are the prime examples of the nature of the immanent modality.
The Root Tautology:
Comparison is isomorphic with interaction and relation
The concept of comparison is isomorphic with the concept of interaction and the concept of relation
All relations are interactions and are comparisons.
All comparisons are interactions and are relations.
The notions of relation, of comparison, and of interaction are themselves also distinct, inseparable, and non-interchangeable.
All three are zero positive metrics.
The Intrinsics of Comparison:
The six concepts of sameness, difference, content, context, objectivity, and subjectivity,
when taken together as a group.
Any comparison will assume a sameness of content or a sameness of context as to be comparison.
Also, the concept of comparison will assume a difference of content or a difference of context.
The concept of comparison will also implicitly assume the distinction and
instantiation of objectivity (what is) and subjectivity (who is).
These are the intrinsics of comparison.
There can be no comparison which does not implicitly imply
the concepts of the subjective and the objective,
a content and a context,
and a sameness and a difference.
The concepts of content and context represent more about a way of thinking about interaction (subjective),
whereas the concepts of sameness and difference are more about interaction itself (objective).
A single comparison,
as the simplest form of theory,
objectifies a link
between a sameness and difference as a content within a context,
with respect to a given subject.
Complex theory consists of many comparisons.
Where there is assumed a sameness of subjective context,
the following four definitions hold about the nature of the objective:
Continuity refers to where there is
a sameness of content and a sameness of context.
Discontinuity refers to where there is
a difference of content and a sameness of context.
Symmetry refers to where there is
a sameness of content and a difference of context.
Asymmetry refers to where there is
a difference of content and a difference of context.
Similarly, the concepts of symmetry and continuity can be expressed in terms of microscopic, mesoscopic, and macroscopic.
Where theory is defined most immediately in terms of the mesoscopic,
the concept of symmetry becomes an assertion about
the macroscopic made from the perspective of the mesoscopic,
and the concept of continuity becomes an assertion about the microscopic
made from the perspective of the mesoscopic.
Symmetry is an assertion of the sameness of parts
that is made from the perspective of the whole.
Continuity is an assertion of the sameness of whole
that is made from the perspective of the parts.
In asserting distinctness, inseparableness, and non-interchangeableness,
the notion of foundational triplication asserts
that there is a fundamental notion of continuity
inherent in the very basis of all considerations of theory or of being.
In asserting that the basis concepts of a domain will have similar
patterns of correspondences across changing domain contexts,
the notion of type isomorphism asserts
that there is a fundamental notion of symmetry
inherent in the very basis of all considerations of theory or of being.
the notion of foundational triplication is ultimately a notion of continuity,
and the notion of type isomorphism is ultimately a notion of symmetry.
The being and concepts of relation, domain, and identity are distinct, inseparable, and non-interchangeable.
A domain is that which contains (includes),
but which is itself uncontained and uncontainable.
A relation is that which divides,
but which is itself indivisible.
An identity is that which has distinction,
but which is otherwise indistinguishable.
In common usage, the meaning of the term "domain" is similar to
the notions of "objective reality", "world", "universe", and "dimension"
(as in the notion of 'a space' in which things happen).
Here, the concept of domain extends to include any realm or class of thought, theory, and/or imagination.
For example, any single language is a domain.
Each system of mathematics or field of scientific study is a domain.
Each individual and personal dream is a domain.
However, in more technical considerations,
the notion of 'a domain' must be regarded as abstract,
rather than as a concrete reference.
A domain is not a container or context in which a certain type of things are content;
rather it is a reference to the combination of a certain set of ideas.
A domain (as a notion) does not refer to a total collection of things
so much as it refers to a common context (or type) of consideration of
three or more mutually associated (and usually fundamental) defining concepts.
In regards to relation, the three concepts of inclusion, proximity, and similarity provide a
necessary and sufficient basis for considering the type
of any instance of a comparison, perception, or relation.
There is no perception, relation, or comparison which cannot
be completely represented in and resolved into at least one or more of these pure types of
"relations of similarity", "relations of proximity", and "relations of inclusion".
For example, all comparison can be ultimately and fundamentally resolved into the
three aspect types of "comparisons which establish inclusion" (i.e., containment; one thing inside of another),
"comparisons which establish proximity", and "comparisons which establish similarity".
The concept of similarity has common basis with the concept of continuity
(via their basis in definition with the concept of "being the same").
The concept of proximity has common basis with the concept of symmetry
(as "to be near one" is to equally have one be near the other).
The concepts of similarity, proximity, and inclusion are distinct, inseparable, and non-interchangeable concepts.
All three notions are zero positive metrics.
In the lexicon of the IM, the Principle of Identity refers to the idea/phrase
"That which is indistinguishable, must be the same".
In other words, if two eventities cannot be distinguished
by any property, logic, measurement, or interaction,
(i.e, two eventities which cannot be distinguished even in principle),
that must be regarded as the same in both identity and beingness.
No semantic reference is to be assigned to that which is indistinguishable
by any means, mode, or method.
For example, if two "things" are in all characteristics alike (position in
space and time, all properties, energies, characters, etc., or any other
forms of dimensioned information) or have the same values for all defined/known
(dimensional) measures, then, by the principle of identity, they are
the same in both consideration and beingness.
If they are not two (or different, if one cannot tell them apart)
then they are (must be) the same, and have common instance.
The notion of 'an identity' can refer to either a noun or a verb, either a thing or a process.
As such the notion of identity can either refer to 'an entity' or 'an event'.
Insofar as it is necessary to preclude prior assumptions about the nature of time,
it is often necessary to refer to these terms in a conjoined manner.
The term Eventity refers to the combination
of the meanings of an entity (thing) and an event.
Each interaction, comparison, and being, is an eventity.
In some contexts, the meaning of the term 'eventity' is also to be
considered as a combination of the concepts of identity and relation.
External (position) Unicity:
where the unique context
of an eventity is necessary and sufficient to define that
eventity as being unique.
Internal (pattern) Unicity:
where the unique content
of an eventity is necessary and sufficient to define that
eventity as being unique.
that class of eventities for which
existence in one place/time prevents/excludes any
similar eventities from existing in that same place/time.
that class of eventities for which
existence in one place/ time does not prevent/exclude
any number of similar eventities from existing in that same place/time.
The meaning of interexclusionary is to assert
that where there is a plurality of contexts,
there must be a singularity of content.
The meaning of intercompositional is to assert
that where there is a singularity of context,
there may be a plurality of content.
Interaction is considered to be
ultimately and independently 'real', in some irreducible sense,
in all formulations of theory
There IS, in some irreducible sense, always interaction.
The Principle of Absolute Unity:
There is assumed to be a class of instances
of comparisons of comparisons such that all instances of the comparisons are the same.
There is always some method of
considering interactions as being the same, identical, or equivalent,
in all formulations of theory
There IS, for each interaction, in some irreducible sense,
a manner in which it is part of an (at least two, arbitrary) abstract whole(s).
The Principle of Absolute Unicity:
There is assumed to be a class of instances
of comparisons of comparisons such that all instances of the comparisons are different.
There is always some method
of considering interactions as being different from one another
(i.e., as at least 'distinctly instanced') in all formulations of theory.
There IS, for each interaction considered as a part of an abstract
whole, in some irreducible sense, a manner in which it is distinct
from all others (unique) in that abstract whole.
All identity is distinct, every distinction is an identity.
The absolute ontology principle establishes the nature of the
concept of instances of interactions within some class,
while the principle of absolute unity and the principle of absolute unicity
establish the nature of comparisons of interactions within that class.
All three principles are necessary and intrinsic
within any concept or consideration of comparison.
In that the concept of an interaction and the concept of a comparison
are isomorphs, the three principles could be stated more formally for
all contents and contexts, explicitly in terms of comparison and its
near allied predicates.
While the principle of unity and the principle of unicity may
initially seem contradictory, there is always a sense in which they
are consistent with one another for any given pair of interactions.
Interactions are always implicitly compared in terms of their various aspects.
The interactions themselves are considered to be complex rather than simple.
As such, there may simultaneously be a sense in which various aspects of a
pair of interactions are the same and in which the various other
aspects of those interactions are different.
The difference and sameness of interactions are the differences and sameness of aspects
of those interactions.
The concepts of difference and sameness are relative concepts
(with respect to the various selected aspects of interaction), and not absolute ones.
This metaphysics regards these concepts
(difference and sameness) as being self evident.
The absolute ontology principle has the nature of the immanent modality.
The principle of absolute unity has the nature of the omniscient modality.
The principle of absolute unicity has the nature of the transcendent modality.
The concepts of existence, reality, and objectivity may be associated
by the principles of unity and unicity:.
The concept of the real
is taken to refer to an application of the absolute ontology principle,
independently of its possible associations with any particular self or domain.
The concept of existence
is taken to be an application of the principle of absolute unity,
relative to a specific domain,
and independent of its possible association with any particular self.
The concept of being (objectivity)
is taken to be an application of the principle of absolute unicity,
relative to a specific self,
and independent of its possible association with any particular domain (world).
Interactions are always in some sense (omniscient) the same, are symmetric, and are constant.
Interactions are also always in some sense (transcendent) distinct (as different),
and are asymmetric (as non-constant, in-equivalent, or increasing).
Any consideration of interaction
(inclusive of all perception or expression between self and reality)
will ultimately rest on and resolve into specific meanings of exactly six aspects,
irreducibly intrinsic to the consideration itself
1st Intrinsic: The distinction of subject and object (patterned and pattern-less, form and feeling)),
is an omniscient modal context.
In all interactions there is always a difference (discontinuity)
between the subjective and the objective.
2nd Intrinsic: The fixed characteristic of the structure of the object (i.e., the platonic eternity),
is an omniscient modal content.
In all interactions there is always a degree of objectivity (symmetry)
with fixed characteristics.
3rd Intrinsic: The irreversibility of change,
is an immanent modal context.
In all interactions (continuity) there is always a subjective irreversibility (asymmetry).
4th Intrinsic: The direction of the flow (of change)
is an immanent modal content.
In all interactions there is always a flow (continuity) of change with
direction (asymmetry) and degrees of intensity.
5th Intrinsic: The transformation of information
is a transcendent modal context.
In all interactions there is always a dynamic of abstraction and/or instruction.
6th Intrinsic: The specification of (addition of non-local and/or non-deterministic) transformation attributes
is a transcendent modal content.
In all interactions there is always a specification of the details (specified information,
gauge values) added or removed.
The concept of a measurement is isomorphic with the concept of an observation, a perception, and an interaction.
Comparison is more than a comparison of 'things'; a comparison is a comparison of interactions.
There are no purely static things; there are only interactions.
Any concept of an event of measurement will involve six intrinsics.
These are inertia (here used with the combined
meanings of mass, pattern, form, shape, and/or structure),
space, force, time, probability, and possibility.
All six of these will be considered, at least implicitly,
in any consideration of any measurement.
The six intrinsics of a measurement can be grouped into two common classes,
those which represent content aspects of a measurement
and those which represent context aspects of measurement.
Pattern, force, and probability are content aspects of measurement.
Space, time, and possibility are context aspects of measurement.
With the concept of physicality, the class concept of 'content'
is composed of the instance concepts of force, inertia, and probability.
With the concept of physicality, the class concept of 'context'
is composed of the instance concepts of time, space, and possibility.
The metrics of Force in time have the nature of the modality of the immanent.
The metrics of inertia (pattern) in space have the nature of the modality of the omniscient.
The metrics of probability in possibility have the nature of the modality of the transcendent.
The six intrinsics of interaction have direct one to one correspondence
with the six intrinsic metrics of any physical domain.
In that the essential nature of all measurement is itself necessarily an interaction,
so does each of the six intrinsics of interaction provide the essential foundations of the metrication basis of all measurements.
1) The metric of space corresponds to a difference between the subjective and the objective
(discontinuous with each other, yet in symmetric relationship to each other).
2) The metric of mass/inertia/pattern
corresponds to objective content with fixed characteristics
(symmetric and discontinuous).
3) The metric of time corresponds to subjective irreversibility
a subjective flow of asymmetric continuous change without (physical) direction or intensity.
4) The metric of force corresponds to an objective asymmetric flow of
continuous change with direction and intensity
5) The metric of possibility corresponds to a dynamic of abstraction and/or instruction
(instruction as 'to put into form').
6) The metric of probability
corresponds to the specification
values added or removed.
The difference between the subjective and the objective,
and the objective content with fixed characteristics,
are the aspects of interaction which have the nature of the omniscient modality.
Subjective irreversibility and the flow of change with direction and intensity
are the aspects of interaction which have the nature of the immanent modality.
The dynamic of abstraction and/or instruction
and the specification of gauge values added or removed,
are aspects of interaction which have the nature of the transcendent modality.
As a fundamental relation (simple), interaction, perception,
expression is (are) not in itself (themselves) further analyzable.
Relations such as these cannot be analyzed except into terms of
other dependent and secondary relations (made complex),
implementing the model elements listed above.
For example, there is no "medium"
of perception (light needs no aether to propagate), as a form or
substance (mass/ inertia/ pattern) which is more basic than the
Interaction can only BE interaction when it directly and
intrinsically involves all of the model aspects listed above.
All other "interactions" are, and can only be, assumed (they are not known).
For example, it is not possible to 'see' a ray of light that is not intersected by the eye.
There are no "interactions" which are between "objects" which are only objective.
All interactions are between a subjective subject and an objective object.
In considering space, time, and possibility, as defined in terms
of the interaction itself, these concepts cannot be considered
as an independent context in which events occur, but rather must
be thought of as coordinating contexts occurring as an aspect of the beingness of the event.
Time is relative to perception; perception is not relative to time.
Time is defined by perception, perception does not occur in time (it 'creates' time)
Space, time, possibility, probability, force, and pattern are aspects of interaction.
The beingness of an interaction establishes the beingness of space, time, and possibility.
The Law of Three:
A relation is always a relation of at least three.
For every pair of concepts, there is always at least one more.
For every interaction or comparison,
there are always at least three intrinsic aspects.
The relation type of inclusion (containment) has the nature of the immanent modality.
The relation type of proximity has the nature of the omniscient modality.
The relation type of similarity has the nature of the transcendent modality.
The essence of the meaning of similarity is always
(at least implicitly) in reference to a collection of
transformations (operators on forms/states).
These transformations are typically across (transcendent to) domains.
Similarity can have no meaning independent of these transformations.
The essence of the meaning of proximity is always (at least implicitly) in reference to a specific domain (a context of form).
Proximity cannot be considered independently of this domain basis.
The Axioms are a defining basis for, and are defined by,
the triple concepts of inclusion, proximity, and similarity.
Axiom I is a statement of proximity.
Axiom II is a statement of inclusion.
Axiom III is a statement of (dis) similarity.
The concept of relation can be understood in terms of the concept of proximity.
The concept of identity can be understood in terms of the concept of similarity (an instance).
The concept of a domain can be understood in terms of the concept of inclusion (a class).
As in reference to a measure that is always considered in terms of its absolute value.
As being either exactly zero, or greater than zero, up to some presumed (possibly infinite) extent.
For example, the 'degree of brightness' is a zero positive metric.
There is an absolute limit (zero) to 'how much dark' is possible in any given space,
yet there is no similar simple limit as to how much light is possible in that same space.
The two concepts 'light' and 'dark' cannot be considered/defined using equivalent contexts of meaning,
(they are not actually opposites),
and thus, cannot be considered as being in symmetric opposition to one another.
Only various degrees of light-ful-ness (being) are defined (ie, as 'positively specified');
there is no "dark" (non-being, zero semantic value) defined (ie, no 'negative specification').
Where no meaning can be given to the contrast class of that which is infinite,
the concept of dark can have no independent meaning (definition, semantic basis) of its own.
The zero is representative of the limit of the microscopic boundary of a measurement domain.
The unit defines the nature of the meaning of the mesoscopic scale.
The extent is representative of the limit of the macroscopic boundary of a measurement domain.
Zero has the nature of the transcendent.
Unity (the unit) has the nature of the immanent.
Infinity (extent) has the nature of the omniscient
Eventities within domains are considered in terms of both scale and location (and possibility).
The concept of scale is equally as fundamental as the concept of location
(position in the domain, defined by proximity, relative to other eventities).
The concept of a scale is not a position or a thing, nor even a direction
in conventional spatial terms.
All numerical (zero-positive) measurements involve as their concepts a zero, a unit, and an extent.
These concepts correspond with position, scale, and direction, respectively.
Position has the nature of the omniscient modality.
Scale has the nature of the transcendent modality.
Direction has the nature of the immanent modality.
In any scale of measurement,
the absolute microscopic corresponds to the infinitesimal number (continuity), zero,
the mesoscopic refers to the unit (one),
and the macroscopic refers to infinity (symmetry).
The quality of positivity has the nature of the immanent modality.
The quality of constancy (symmetry, equality, conservation) has the nature of the omniscient modality.
The quality of increase (continuity, inequality, evolution)) has the nature of the transcendent modality.
Within the lexicon of the IM, the notions of the finite, the countably infinite, and the uncountably infinite,
are considered to be distinct, inseprable, and non-interchangeable.
The countably finite, (also known as the 'integr numbers' and alternately also 'aleph null'),
is a kind of infinity known to be distinct from that represented by the real number continiuum
(also known as 'the reals', and/or 'aleph one').
The concept of the finite has the nature of the modality of the immanent.
The concept of the countable infinite has the nature of the modality of the omniscient.
The concept of the uncountable infinite has the nature of the modality of the transcendant
The concept of 'universe', as a class, is to be understood only
and exactly as the combined meanings of the instances of the concepts
of existence, interaction, and creation (neither more nor less).
The concept of universe itself is not to be considered as the
total summation of the instances of the beingness of (only) existing
things and the (single) space-time that they live in.
The meaning and being of 'universe' is abstract, not concrete.
The notion of universe is a specific instance of the more general concept of a 'domain'.
The notion of 'a domain' is not a
'container' or context in which a certain type of relations and identities
are defined as content, so much as it is a placeholder or combined reference
to three commonly associated fundamental defining notions.
To understand the nature of the
universe is to understand fully the nature and implications of
only (the class concepts of) creation, interaction, and existence.
This is at once necessary, and sufficient.
Creation, existence, and interaction are distinct yet inseparable from one another.
The being of one necessarily involves the other two.
Any consideration of one implies the (at least implicit) consideration of the other two
Interaction has the nature of the immanent modality.
Existence has the nature of the omniscient modality.
Creation has the nature of the transcendent modality.
This inherently implies a transition away from an immediate personal sense of involvement,
which in some contexts of consideration, is also very important to keep track of.
For example, in communication there is an inherent aspect of subjectivity
in the minds perceiving a message.
There is an inherent aspect of
objectivity in the coordination of subjectivity, as found in the common
shared external references (the language used as a basis or "carrier" of communication meaning;
the shared context of all participants).
Similar considerations apply to comparison,
which may also be modeled as a special type of communication event.
To make assertions such as the following: "there exists only one world"
or even "there exist more than one world", "many domains exist", etc.,
would be applying the concept of existence outside of its range of meaning
There is no (single ultimate) ground domain/world in which all other
domains are established as either existing or not.
One can, however, assert "there are many worlds",
or "many worlds are real",
for the meaning of being is different from that of existing.
Being is immanent (or in the case of worlds, transcendent),
whereas existing is omniscient.
Un-patterned form, unpredictability, and randomness are as necessary for
the establishment of a degree of objectivity to any perceived actuality as are
the consistent correspondences formed by a consensus among multiple observers
in common communication.
In practice, the reality of the perceiver and the perceived depends/descends
from the real nature of the perceiving (one cannot not perceive).
Perception is more basic than the perceiver and/or the perceived.
insofar as that which is not real is regarded as being illusion,
the being of both the perceiver (self) and the perceived (world)
must be regarded as illusionary
(since neither of these are the action of perceiving/perception itself;
the relation between self and world (which is real) is neither self nor world).
The concept of comparison is considered to be a special
case of the more general concept of interaction.
Interaction itself is considered to be a special case of the more general concept of relationship.
A measurement (an observation, regardless of kind) is an interaction.
This is an assertion about the very being of comparison,
as directly isomorphic with the very being of interaction and the very essence of the
nature of relation itself.
This is an assertion about the theory of
comparison, interaction, and relationship, as a basis of theoretical understanding.
As such, anything which is inherent in the nature of any one of these three is in
essence also (necessarily) inherent in the others.
The meaning of the term ontology is usually taken to refer to the
philosophical study of the nature of beingness in itself.
This principle asserts that for any instance of a thing,
there has to be some manner in which the thing is like, or comparable to, any other thing.
There is always some manner by which to regard any two things
as being similar, or the same as, one another.
The term "intrinsic" is used herein to distinguish against
(and avoid) other possible interpretations/ connotations,
(particularly those which indicate ideas of "causality" or of "predication").
The six intrinsics model is a view of the essential meaning of the term 'interaction',
and is itself neither more nor less fundamental than the concept of interaction.
The concept of space is an abstraction of the meaning of the distinction between subject and object.
While the concept of space may relativize
the nature of origin and scale (the subjective position and size
of the self, i.e, the distance from "here", or one's 'point of view'),
it does not (cannot) remove the necessity of the application/ instance
of origin, scale, and distance altogether.
The concept of mass (inertia) is an abstraction of the meaning
of the fixed characteristic (pattern, form, structure, and content) of the objective.
The concept of 'information' (i.e, fixed pattern)
which is perceived is itself inseparable from the essence of the
meaning of measurement.
The concept of time (the arrow of time) is based on, and is an abstraction of,
the characteristic irreversibility of the being of an interaction.
The concept of force is based on and is an abstraction of the
concept of the aspect of direction in interaction.
There can be no force which is not without direction.
Within the context of the objective and subjective (see space above),
this distinguishes between perception, as an interaction, and expression, as an interaction.
The concept of possibility is an abstraction of the meaning of
transformation, as an intrinsic aspect of all interactions (i.e, the mediation of the interaction itself).
In the context of perception, the transformation is referred to as abstractive;
in the context of expression, the transformation is referred to as "instructive".
The concept of probability is based upon the concept of the specification aspects (complementary to transformation) of interaction.
The probability of an event within the domain is not defined by the domain, but is rather defined by adding information/ detail to it.
'Gauge constants' refer to that 'information' which is added or removed in the process of either abstraction or instruction
(together having the meaning of transformation).
As an extension of this, events do not happen in a place, at a location, in a given moment of time.
Rather they have (as aspects of themselves) position, duration, and possibility,
which may be aligned via coordination/comparison with these
same aspects of other events (eventities) so as to create a
common context of comparison (what most people think of as
these metrics -- as an objective context).
Due to a shift in the context of consideration (Axiom II),
the modalities of the position, scale, direction triple are phase
shifted with respect to the triple of zero, unit, and extent.
Ie, it is regarded that sets are always at least exactly one of the distinct classes of either finite, countably infinite, or uncountably infinite.
While there may be posited multiple distinct varieties of 'uncountably infinite', such fine distinctions are not considered relevant in this context.
For example, existence without perception (a special case of interaction)
has no semantic value of its own.
To hypothesize the existence of a thing for which there is no conceivable interaction,
direct, indirect, (that one cannot see it, touch it, sense it,
smell it, measure it with any instrumentation, etc), would be meaningless.
What does existence really mean if there is no way to
personally establish its existence in one's own subjective context?
Any form or establishment of an ontological status relies on and
implements a relation, an immanent interaction of perception.
A claim of existence prior to perception is un-provable and non-demonstrable.